Winning in Emerging-Market Cities. 5. One-third of the world's population—. billion people—live in cities that are located in the emerging markets. By Winning in Emerging Markets: A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (e-Book) - Download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read online. Winning In Emerging Markets: A Road Map For Strategy And Execution By Tarun. Khanna, Krishna G. Palepu pdf download. Winning In.
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𝗣𝗗𝗙 | From the Preface: The research journey for this book began fifteen years ago when we were teaching in a Harvard Business School. Winning in Emerging Markets. Course Module in International Business. Course Modules help instructors select and sequence material for use as part of a. by Ming Zeng and Peter J. Williamson. Winning in the. World's Emerging. Markets ,. 2nd Edition. Rivals from developing countries are invading your turf. How will.
Many leading multinationals are finding that their biggest competitors in emerging economies are local players and not other big global names. The same goes for a range of industries, such as home appliances or e-commerce, and not just in China and India. In most cases, the fact that local companies have been outperforming foreign multinationals cannot be blamed on protectionist regulations or unfair competition. A study I conducted with Peter J. Local firms can turn quickly to consecutive shifts, which means attempts by multinationals to adapt to the local market lag behind developments; 3. Together, these three factors make local firms a force to be reckoned with. Leveraging the world at home It was often assumed that globalisation would only favour large multinationals from the developed world, which could transfer physical as well as intangible assets within themselves cheaply and efficiently.
Emerging China can only be anticipated, and partially so, by those who are actively engaged in building it. If you go there today, by the time you appreciate what is happening, it will have moved on.
Multinationals are, at best, slow to adapt to such rapid social and institutional shifts in an alien field and often miss the boat. Local integration The "home team" in an emerging market has an additional advantage: it can anticipate changes because it is actively engaged in developing the playing field and co-evolving with it, as the game plays out.
Unless the visitors have some remarkable superiority that works well in any situation, they are bound to lose.
Transforming the field and playing at the same time is taxing for the home team but they have a particularly powerful motivation: it is their home, after all. site and site were early entrants in China when e-commerce was just beginning there.
They found an embryonic market in a vast country with no reliable and efficient infrastructure for delivery or credit card payments. How could they adapt their plays to that field? Alibaba, a local e-commerce company, decided to introduce new plays and change the playing field.
It created AliPay, a special payment system with Alibaba acting as intermediary and guardian by providing a trust account that did not release funds to the seller until the downloader was satisfied ; it partnered with forty local banks and with China Post, so that AliPay accounts could be re-charged nationwide; and it worked with the Post and several local delivery and logistics companies around China to develop and facilitate the collection and delivery of parcels.
Alibaba continued to transform the local landscape for e-commerce, as well as itself, actively influencing the development of the market in China while simultaneously evolving with it. Natura, the leading player in the local market for toiletries, perfumes and cosmetics in Brazil, was a pioneer in using a variety of rainforest plants and trees as key ingredients for its products.
Natura worked hand-in-hand with 32 local communities in the poorer North of Brazil, often in remote regions, and helped build and develop the skills and methods of over 5, small suppliers there. At the same time its strategy encouraged greater protection of the environment and was instrumental in building public awareness about the need for greater sustainability in Brazil. Natura was perceived to be sharing its destiny with that of the country, something that multinationals rarely achieve outside their own home country.
Local integration requires the active involvement and commitment of a company to a place and its community.
Being embedded locally is not enough, let alone just cloning a foreign operation. This is obvious. Not surprisingly: GE is a global American company, profoundly engaged with, and a long contributor to, the development of its home country.
Likewise with Alibaba and Xiaomi and Natura and many other local companies in emerging markets. Such an alien visitor may still win there, but only when the local market values it because it is foreign, or because it comes with unique offerings that locals value, or both.
Otherwise, in emerging markets, local companies will continue to win. Large, low-cost, and increasingly educated labor pools, meanwhile, give these markets tremendous competitive advantage in production, and information technology is enabling companies to exploit labor in these markets in unique ways.
Some observers see the financial crisis of — as an inflection point, accelerating the emergence of these markets as domi- nant players in the global economy. A deeper discussion might elicit a list of the persistent headaches of doing business in emerging markets.
These markets, the executives might say, are prone to financial crises. Intellectual property rights are insecure. Navigating government bureaucracies can be thorny. Product quality is unreliable. Local talent is insufficient to staff operations.
Reli- ably assessing customer credit is difficult. Overcoming impediments to distribution can be frustrating. Sorting through investment opportuni- ties or performing due diligence on potential partners is often a guessing game. Others might throw up their hands and say that corruption is so endemic in emerging markets that the risks simply outweigh the poten- tial rewards.
Based on many of these signs of emergence, some might say, emerging markets are not distinctly different from other markets; rather, they are simply starting from a lower base and rapidly catching up. Indicators such as the growing numbers of emerging market-based companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the growing ranks of billionaires from emerging markets listed annually by Forbes illustrate this trend.
We see these features of emerging markets as symptoms of underlying mar- ket structures that share common, important, and persistent differences from those in developed economies. A fundamental premise of our work is that emerging markets reflect those transactional arenas where downloaders and sellers are not easily or effi- ciently able to come together.
By relying on outcome criteria to assess markets, managers often overlook the ways in which emerging markets operate differently than do developed economies. Intuitively, managers know that operating a business in an emerging market is different from doing so in a developed economy.
It is tempting to chalk up these differences simply to country context. Indeed, market structures are the products of idiosyncratic historical, political, legal, economic, and cultural forces within any country. All emerging markets feature institutional voids, however, although the particular combina- tion and severity of these voids varies from market to market. An Actionable Framework The chapters in this book identify ways in which the uniqueness of emerging markets is shaping the business opportunities and challenges in these economies.
We offer a simple actionable framework to help Introduction 7 managers map the institutional context of any emerging market.
By developing a granular understanding of the underlying market structure of emerging economies—and not only cataloging symptoms to be incor- porated in an overall risk assessment—companies can tailor their strate- gies and execution in emerging markets to avoid mistakes and outcompete rivals. In part I of this book, we unpack our structural definition of emerging markets by examining the institutional anatomy of these economies.
In part II, we apply this framework to the challenges facing various actors as they manage in these contexts: companies filling voids as intermediaries; multinationals based in developed markets; and domestic companies based in emerging markets, which we call emerging giants.
Companies of various stripes face similar strategic choices as they respond to institutional voids in emerging markets. Replicate or adapt?
Institutional voids invariably challenge the execu- tion of business models in emerging markets.