the Analysis of the Ego, · The Ego and the ID, · Facts of Sigmund Freud. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life () by Freud - Free PDF eBook . The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (Zur Psychopathologie des . AM] . Home Boris Archives Menu Letter to ronaldweinland.info 9. Psychopathology of Everyday Life Sigmund Freud () Translation by A. A. Brill () NTRODUCTION Professor Freud developed his system of.
|Language:||English, Spanish, German|
|Genre:||Politics & Laws|
|ePub File Size:||17.33 MB|
|PDF File Size:||17.34 MB|
|Distribution:||Free* [*Register to download]|
Psychopathology of Everyday Life versation we drifted—I no longer remember how. —to the social position of the race to which we both belonged. He, being. Transform Your Life, Work, and Confidence with Everyday Courage The 5 Second Rule: Transform Your Psychopathology of Everyday Life - Sigmund Freud. ronaldweinland.info Presents. Psychopathology of Everyday Life. By. Prof. Dr. Sigmund Freud (). (First Translation by A. A. Brill in ).
I've taken subjects from a range of disciplines, please see subjects listed below that I can hel Reviews absolutely loved it!! Anonymous, Semester 1, The best elective, co-ordinated perfectly, content was incredible, so interesting and diverse. The exam was exceptional, the guidance you receive is exactly the way it should be. I l did very well but only because everything about this subject was deeply considered. Chris Groot is wonderful!
James Strachey objected that "Almost the whole of the basic explanations and theories were already present in the earliest edition Among the most overtly autobiographical of Freud's works,  the Psychopathology was strongly linked by Freud to his relationship with Wilhelm Fliess. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
October Studying the various deviations from the stereotypes of everyday behavior, strange defects and malfunctions, as well as seemingly random errors, the author concludes that they indicate the underlying pathology of the psyche, the symptoms of psychoneurosis.
Freud writes in his introduction: During the year I published a short essay on the Psychic Mechanism of Forgetfulness. I shall now repeat its contents and take it as a starting-point for further discussion. I have there undertaken a psychologic analysis of a common case of temporary forgetfulness of proper names, and from a pregnant example of my own observation I have reached the conclusion that this frequent and practically unimportant occurrence of a failure of a psychic function — of memory — admits an explanation which goes beyond the customary utilization of this phenomenon.
If an average psychologist should be asked to explain how it happens that we often fail to recall a name which we are sure we know, he would probably content himself with the answer that proper names are more apt to be forgotten than any other content of memory.
He might give plausible reasons for this "forgetting preference" for proper names, but he would not assume any deep determinant for the process. Freud believed that various deviations from the stereotypes of everyday conduct - seemingly unintended reservation, forgetting words, random movements and actions - are a manifestation of unconscious thoughts and impulses. These substitutive names occur spontaneously in a number of cases; in other cases, where they do not come spontaneously, they can be brought to the surface by concentration of attention, and they then show the same relation to the repressed ele- ment and the lost name as those that come [p.
Two factors seem to play a part in bringing to consciousness the substitutive names: I could find the latter in the greater or lesser facil- ity which forms the required outer associations between the two elements.
A great many of the cases of name-forgetting without faulty recollection therefore belong to the cases with substitutive name forma- tion, the mechanism of which corresponds to the one in the example Signorelli.
But I surely shall not venture to assert that all cases of name-forgetting belong to the same group. There is no doubt that there are cases of name-forgetting that proceed in a much simpler way. We shall represent this state of affairs carefully enough if we assert that besides the simple forgetting of proper names there is another forgetting which is motivated by repression. CHAPTER 2 Forgetting of Foreign Words The ordinary vocabulary of our own language seems to be protected against forgetting within the limits of normal function, but it is quite different with words from a foreign language.
The tendency to forget such words extends to all parts of speech. In fact, depending on our own general state and the degree of fatigue, the first manifestation of functional disturbance evinces itself in the irregularity of our control over foreign vocabulary. In a series of cases this forgetting follows the same mechanism as the one revealed in the example Signorelli. As a demonstration of this I shall report a single analysis, charac- terized, however, by valuable features, concerning the forgetting of a word, not a noun, from a Latin quotation.
Before proceeding, allow me to give a full and clear account of this little episode. Last summer, while journeying on my vacation, I renewed the acquaintance of a young man of aca- demic education, who, as I soon noticed, was conversant with some of my works. In our con- [p. He, being ambitious, bemoaned the fact that his generation, as he expressed it, was des- tined to grow crippled, that it was prevented from developing its talents and from gratifying its desires. He concluded his passionately felt speech with the familiar verse from Virgil: There is something missing in this verse.
How does it read in its complete form? I think of the old accusation which has been brought against the Jews again, and of the work of Kleinpaul, who sees in these supposed sacrifices reincarnations or revivals, so to speak, of the Saviour. I now think of an article in an Italian journal which I have recently read. I believe it was entitled: Augustine said Concerning Women.
I recall a handsome old gentleman whom I met on my journey last week. He was really an original type. He looked like a big bird of prey. His name, if you care to know, is Benedict. Simon, St. Augustine, and St. I believe that there was a Church father named Origines. Three of these, moreover, are Christian names, like Paul in the name Kleinpaul. Januarius and his blood miracle -- I find that the thoughts are running mechani- cally.
Januarius and St. Augustine have something to do with the calendar. Will you recall to me the blood miracle? The blood of St. Januarius is preserved in a phial in a church in Na- ples, and on a certain holiday a miracle takes place causing it to liquefy. The people think a great deal of this miracle, and become very excited if the liquefying process is retarded, as happened once during the French occupation. The General in command -- or Garibaldi, if I am not mistaken -- then took the priest aside, and with a very significant gesture pointed out to him the soldiers arrayed without, and expressed his hope that the miracle would soon take place.
And it actually took place.. Why do you hesitate? Do you think so? Well, I suddenly thought of a woman from whom I could easily get a mes- sage that would be very annoying to us both.
You prepared me for it long enough. Just think of the saints of the calendar, the liquefying of the blood on a certain day, the excitement if the event does not take place, and the distinct threat that the miracle must take place.
Indeed, you have elaborated the miracle of St. Januarius into a clever allusion to the courses of the woman. Shall I also add to this connection the fact that St. Simon, to whom you got by way of the reliques, was sacrificed as a child? I hope you do not take these thoughts -- if I really entertained them -- seriously. I will, however, confess to you that the lady is Italian, and that I visited Naples in her company.
But may not all this be coincidental? First, because in this case I was able to make use of a source which is otherwise inaccessible to me. Most of the examples of psychic disturbances of daily life that I have here com- piled I was obliged to take from observation of myself. I endeavoured to evade the far richer material furnished me by my neurotic patients, because I had to preclude the objection that the phenomena in question were only the result and manifestation of the neurosis.
It was therefore of special value for my purpose to have a stranger free from a neurosis offer himself as a subject for such examination. This analysis is also important in other respects, inasmuch as it elucidates a case of word-forgetting without substitutive recollection, and thus confirms the principle formulated above, namely, that the appear- ance or nonappearance of incorrect substitutive recollections does not constitute an essential distinc- tion.
In the latter example the reproduction of the name becomes disturbed through the after-ef- fects of a stream of thought which began shortly before and was interrupted, but whose content had no distinct relation to the new theme which contained the name Signorelli.
Between the repression and the theme of the forgotten name there existed only the relation of temporal contiguity, which reached the other in order that the two should be able to form a connection [p. The disturbance of the reproduction proceeded here from the inner part of the theme touched upon, and was brought about by the fact that unconsciously a contradiction arose against the wish-idea rep- resented in the quotation.
The origin must be construed in the following manner: The speaker deplored the fact that the pres- ent generation of his people was being deprived of its rights, and like Dido he presaged that a new generation would take upon itself vengeance against the oppressors.
He therefore expressed the wish for posterity. In this moment he was interrupted by the contradictory thought: That is not true. Just think in what a predicament you would be if you should now receive the information that you must expect posterity from the quarter you have in mind! No, you want no posterity -- as much as you need it for your venge-[p.
Another important agreement with the example Signo- relli results from the fact that the contradiction originates from repressed sources and emanates from thoughts which would cause a deviation of attention. So much for the diversity and the inner relationship of both paradigms of the forgetting of names.
In the course of this discussion we shall repeat- edly meet with this process, which seems to me to be the more easily understood. Footnotes  This is the usual way of bringing to consciousness hidden ideas. The Interpretation of Dreams, pp.
Here, too, the forgetting seems to be accompanied by substitutive formations. When I later asked my companion whether in his effort to recall the forgot- ten word he did not think of some substitution, he informed me that he was at first tempted to put an ab into the verse: Being sceptical, he added that it was apparently due to the fact that it was the first word of the verse. But when I asked him to focus his attention on the associations to exoriare he gave me the word exorcism. This makes me think that the reinforcement of exoriare in the reproduction has really the value of such substitution.
It probably came through the association exorcism from the names of the saints. However, those are refinements upon which no value need be laid. It seems now quite possible that the appearance of any kind of substitu- tive recollection is a constant sign -- perhaps only characteristic and misleading -- of the purposive forgetting motivated by repression. This substitution might also existing the reinforcement of an element akin to the thing forgotten, even where incorrect substitutive names fail to appear.
Thus, in the example Signorelli, as long as the name of the painter remained inaccessible to me, I had more than a clear visual memory of the cycle of his frescoes, and of the picture of himself in the corner; at least it was more intensive than any of my other visual memory traces. In another case, also reported in my essay of , I had hopelessly forgotten the street name and address connected with a disagreeable visit in a strange city, but -- as if to mock me --the house number appeared especially vivid, whereas the memory of numbers usually causes me the greatest difficulty.
In carefully following the repressed thought concerning the theme of death and sexual life, one does strike an idea which shows a near relation to the theme of the frescoes of Orvieto. To be sure, one is not wont to besurprised if after awhile a formula or poem learned by heart can only bereproduced imperfectly, with variations and gaps. Still, as this forgettingdoes not affect equally all the things learned together, but seems to pickout therefrom definite parts, it may be worth our effort to investigateanalytically some examples of such faulty reproductions.
Brill reports the following example: To her great surprise, onreferring to the book she found that not only was the last line misquotedbut that there were many other mistakes. The correct lines read as follows: I could readily convince her, however, that there was no qualitativeor quantitative disturbance of memory in her case, and recalled to herour conversation immediately before quoting these lines. She continued: Still, it is a wonderful experience; worth goingthrough, notwithstanding the terrible disappointments that usually follow.
It puts us on a level with the gods and incites us to all sorts of artisticactivities. We become real poets; we not only memorize and quote poetry,but we often become Apollos ourselves. As a teacher of elocution she was wont to memorize so much andso often that it was difficult to tell just when she had memo- rized theselines. Have you perhaps memorized this poem when youwere in such a state?
Twelve years before, when she was eighteen years old,she fell in love. She met the young man while participating in an amateurtheatrical performance. He wasendowed with all the attributes needed for such a calling.
He was wellbuilt, fascinating, impulsive, very clever, and. She was warned against him, but she [p. Everything went well for a few months,when she suddenly received word that her Apollo, for whom she had memorizedthese lines, had eloped with and married a very wealthy young woman. The discussion about the over-estimationof personality among lovers unconsciously recalled to her a disagreeableexperience, when she herself over-estimated the personality of the manshe loved.
The episode could not come to the surface becauseit was determined by very disagreeable and painful thoughts, but the unconsciousvariations in the poem plainly showed her pres- ent mental state. The poeticexpressions were not only changed to prosaic ones, but they clearly allud- edto the whole episode. Jung, quotingthe words of the author: Ferenczi, of Budapest. Unlike the former examples, itdoes not refer to a verse taken from [p. It may also demonstrate to us the rather unusual case where theforgetting places itself at the disposal of discretion when the latteris in danger of yielding to a momentary desire.
The mistake thus advancesto a useful function. After we have sobered down we justify that innerstriving which at first could manifest itself only by way of inability,as in forgetting or psychic impotence.
One of the guests thought this observation very good, whichin turn emboldened me to remark -- probably to ensure myself of the goodopinion of the well-disposed critic -- that some time ago I thought ofsomething still better.
But when I was about to repeat this clever ideaI was unable to recall it. Thereupon I immediately withdrew from the companyand wrote my concealing thoughts. I first recalled the name of the friendwho had witnessed the birth of this desired thought, and of the streetin Budapest where it took place, and then the name of another friend, whosename was Max, whom we usually called Maxie. Strangely enough, I didnot recall any maxim but the following sentence: Immediately I recalled the sought-for recollection.
The capitis diminutio is therefore common to both. The whole matter[p. It is not always very convenient to reportsuch analyses, for, just as those cited, they usually lead to intimateand painful things in the person analysed; I shall therefore add no moreto the number of such examples.
What is common to all these cases, regardlessof the material, is the fact that the forgotten or distorted material becomesconnected through some associative road with an unconscious stream of thought,which gives rise to the influence that comes to light as forgetting. I am now returning to the forgetting of names, concerning which we haveso far considered exhaustively neither the casuistic elements nor the motives. As this form of faulty acts can at times be abundantly observed in myself,I am not at a loss for examples.
The slight attacks [p. Still, just such cases as mine may furnish the cause for a strong objectionto our analytic efforts. Should not one be forced to conclude from suchobservations that the causation of the forgetfulness, especially the forgettingof names, is to be sought in circulatory or functional disturbances ofthe brain, and spare himself the trouble of searching for psychologic explanationsfor these phenomena?
Not at all; that would mean to interchange the mechanismof a process, which is the same in all cases, with its varia- tions. Butinstead of an analysis I shall cite a comparison which will settle theargument. Let us assume that I was so reckless as to take a walk at night in anuninhabited neighbourhood of a big city, and was attacked and robbed ofmy watch and purse. At the nearest police-station I report the matter inthe following words: To be correct, the stateof affairs could only be described by say- ing that, favoured by thelonesomeness of the place and under cover of darkness, I was robbedof my valuables by unknown malefactors.
Now, then, the state of affairs in forgetting names need not be different. Favoured by exhaustion, circu- latory disturbances, and intoxication, I amrobbed by an unknown psychic force of the disposal over the proper namesbelonging to my memory; it is the same force which in other cases may bringabout the same failure of memory during perfect health and mental capacity.
Following the convenient and commendable practice ofthe Zurich School Bleuler, Jung, Riklin , I might express the same thingin the following form: The relation of the name to my person is an unex- pected one, andis mostly brought about through superficial associations words of doublemeaning and of [p. A few simple examples will best illustrate the natureof the same: I knew of such a place very near Genoa, I also recalled thename of the German colleague who was in charge of the place, but the placeitself I could not name, well as I believed I knew it.
There was nothingleft to do but ask the patient to wait, and to appeal quickly to the womenof the family. So- and-so remained so long under treatment? The name is Nervi. Idisputed the existence of any third inn, and referred to the fact thatI had spent seven summers in the vicinity and therefore knew more aboutthe place than he. Instigated by my contradiction, he recalled the name.
But why should I have forgotten the name and the object?
I believe becausethe name sounded very much like that of a Vienna col- league who practisedthe same specialty as my own. I was forcedto look it up in the time-table. The name was Rosehome Rosenheim. I soondiscovered through what as- sociations I lost it. One day I was consulted by a young man, younger brother of one of myfemale patients, whom I saw any number of times, and whom I used to callby his fist name. Later, while wishing to talk about his visit, I forgothis first name, in no way an unusual one, and could not recall it in anyway.
I walked into the street to read the business signs and recognizedthe name as soon as it met my eyes. Subsequently I also understoodthe substitutive names, Daniel and Frank, which obtruded them- selves withoutany explanation. The analysis had to befollowed over a long devious road before the desired name was dis- covered. The patient expressed his apprehension lest he should lose his eyesight;this recalled a young man who became blind from a gunshot, and this againled to a picture of another youth who shot him- self, and the latter borethe same name as my first patient, though not at all related to him.
Thename became known to me, however, only after the anxious apprehension fromthese two juvenile cases was transferred to a person of my own family. It seems as if I were forced to comparewith my own person all that I hear about strangers, as if my personal complexesbecame stirred up at every information from others. It seems impossiblethat this should be an individual pecu- liarity of my own person; it must,on the contrary, point to the way we grasp outside matters in general.
I have reasons to assume that other individuals meet with experiences quitesimilar to mine. The best example of this kind was reported to me by a gentleman namedLederer as a personal expe- rience. While on his wedding trip in Venice hecame across a man with whom he was but slightly ac- quainted, and whom hewas obliged to introduce to his wife. As he forgot the name of the strangerhe got himself out of the embarrassment the first time by mumbling thename unintelligibly.
But when he met the man a second time, as is inevitablein Venice, he took him aside and begged him to help him out of the difficultyby telling him his name, which he unfortunately had forgotten. The answerof the stranger pointed to a superior knowledge of human nature: My name is like yours -- Lederer! I had recently felt it very plainlywhen I was consulted during my office hours by a man named S. However,I am assured by one of my own critics that in this respect he behaves inquite the op- posite manner.
In spite of the fact that Mr.
Here the forgetting is manifestly a direct result of the dislikeof Y. I donot understand them. I hear that they were both homosexual. The remarkable thing is thatthe concealing thoughts of the desired name came to the surface [p.
To the question howI knew this I boldly replied that I had taken an interest in Gassendi fora long time. This resulted in a certificate with a magna cum laude,but later, unfortunately, also in a persistent tendency to forget the nameGassendi. I believe that it is due to my guilty conscience that even nowI cannot retain this name despite all efforts. I had no business knowingit at that time. I add here another example of forgetting the name of a city, an instancewhich is perhaps not as sim- ple as those given before, but which will [p.
Ferenczi, who observed this case of forgettingin himself, treated it -- quite justly -- as an analysis of a dream oran erotic idea. Some one remarked that they still showed the Austrianinfluence. A few of these cities were cited. Instead of the de- sired name of the city thereobtruded themselves the following thoughts: I finally thought of the desired name: Her name was Veronica;in Hungarian Verona.
I felt a great antipathy for her on ac- count of herrepulsive physiognomy, as well as her hoarse, shrill voice and her unbearableself-assertion to which she thought herself entitled on account of herlong service.
Also the tyrannical way in which she treated the childrenof the family was insufferable to me. Now I knew the significance of thesubstitu- tive thoughts. The Hungarian word kapzoi greedafter money surely furnished a determinant for the displacement. NaturallyI also found those more direct associations which connected Capua and Veronaas geographi- cal ideas and as Italian words of the same rhythm.
The most hated name [p. From the hated tyrantHaynau one stream of thought leads over Brescia to the city of Verona,and the other over the idea of the grave-digging ani- mal with the hoarsevoice which corresponds to the thought of a monument to the dead ,to the skull, and to the disagreeable organ of Veronica, which was so cruellyinsulted in my unconscious mind.
Veronica in her time ruled as tyranicallyas did the Austrian General after the Hungarian and Italian struggles forliberty. Since that time she has changed in herappearance and manner, very much to her advantage, so that I am able tomeet her with sincere regard to be sure I hardly find such occasion. As usual, however, my unconscious sticks more tenaciously to those impressions;it is old in its resentment. Also this jocose recol- lection might have takenpart in the displacement of the hyena by the lion.
Calatafini,was it not? Whenever I hear some one forget a name it immediately produces forgetfulnessin me. Let us look for the name. I cannot think of any other [p. He added: Suppose we try tofind out. For example, what is the name of the place situated on a heightwhich was called Enna in antiquity?
For a moment the elder still lacked the feeling of recognition, butafter he accepted the name he was able to state why it had escaped him.
He thought: I am aware that I am not quite anxious to think of ageing,and react peculiarly when I am reminded of it. Thus, e. Somewhat later he added: And now it occurs to me that the name Castrogiovanni, whichobtruded itself with the aid of a rationalization, alludes as expresslyto giovane, young, as the last name, Castelvetrano, to veteran.
What the motive was that led the young man to this memory failurewas not investigated. In some cases one must have recourse to all the fineness of psychoanalytictechnique in order to explain the forgetting of a name.
Those who wishto read an example of such work I refer to a communication by ProfessorE. I shall,however, take the liberty of comprehending in a few sentences the resultsof the analyses reported here. Betweenthe disturbed name and the disturbing complex there exists a connectioneither from the beginning or such a connection has been formed -- perhapsby artificial means - through superficial outer associations.
The self-reference complex personal, family or professional provesto be the most effective of the dis- turbing complexes. A name which by virtue of its many meanings belongs to a number of thoughtassociations complexes is frequently disturbed in its connection to oneseries of thoughts through a stronger complex belonging to the other associations. To avoid the awakening of pain through memory is one of the objectsamong the motives of these dis- turbances. In general one may distinguish two principal cases of name-forgetting;when the name itself touches something unpleasant, or when it is broughtinto connection with other associations which are influ- enced by such effects.
So that names can be disturbed on their own account or [p. A review of these general principles readily convinces us that the temporaryforgetting of a name is ob- served as the most frequent faulty action ofour mental functions.
However, we are far from having described all the peculiarities of thisphenomenon. I also wish to call attention to the fact that name-forgettingis extremely contagious. In a conversation between two per- sons the meremention of having forgotten this or that name by one often suffices toinduce the same memory slip in the other. But whenever the forgetting isinduced, the sought for name easily comes to the surface.
There is also a continuous forgetting of names in which whole chainsof names are withdrawn from memory. If in the course of endeavouring todiscover an escaped name one finds others with which the latter is intimatelyconnected, it often happens that these new names also escape.
The forgettingthus jumps from one name to another, as if to demonstrate the existenceof a hindrance not to be easily removed. Peterson and A. Psychoanalyse, I. Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. II, Heft 2, As it is known that the memory exercises a certain selection among the impressions at its disposal, it would seem logical to suppose that this selection follows entirely different principles in childhood than at the time of intel- lectual maturity. However, close investigation points to the fact that such an assumption is superfluous.
The indifferent childhood memories owe their existence to a process of displacement. It be shown by psychoanalysis that in the reproduction they represent the substitute for [p. In the aforementioned essay I only touched upon, but in no way exhausted, the varieties in the relations and meanings of concealed memories. In the given example fully analysed I particularly emphasized a peculiarity in temporal relation between the concealing and the contents of the memory concealed by it.
The content of the concealing memory in that example belonged to one of the first of childhood, while the thoughts represents it which remained practically unconscious, belonged to a later period of the individual question. I called this form of displacement a retroactive or regressive one. Perhaps more often one finds the reversed relation -- that is, an indifferent impression of the most remote period becomes a concealing memory in consciousness, which simply owes its existence to an association with an earlier experience, against whose direct reproduction there are resistances.
We would call these en- croaching or interposing concealing memories. What most concerns memory lies here chronologically beyond [p. Finally, there may be a third possible case, namely, the concealing memory may be connected with the impression it conceals, not only through its contents, just through contiguity of time; this is the contemporaneous, or contiguous concealing memory.
How large a portion of the sum total of our memory belongs to the category of concealing memories, and what part it plays in various neurotic hidden processes, these are problems into the value of which I have neither inquired nor shall I enter here.
I am concerned only with emphasizing the sameness between the forgetting of proper names with faulty recollection and the formation of concealing memo- ries. At first sight it would seem that the diversities of both phenomena are far more striking than their exact analogies.
There we deal with proper names, here with complete impressions experienced either in reality or in thought; there we deal with a manifest failure of the memory function, here with a memory act which appears strange to us.
Again, there we are concerned with a momentary disturbance -- for the name just forgotten could have been reproduced correctly a hundred times before, and will be so again from tomorrow on; here we deal with lasting possesion without a failure, for the indifferent child- [p. In both these cases the riddle seems to be solved in an entirely different way.
There it is the forgetting, while here it is the remembering which excites our scientific curiosity. After deeper reflection one realizes that though there is a diversity in the psychic material and in the du- ration of time of the two phenomena, yet these are by far outweighed by the conformities between the two.
In both cases we deal with the failure of remember what should be correctly reproduced by mem- ory fails to appear, and instead something else comes as a substitute. In the case of getting a name there is no lack of memory function in the form of name substitution. The formation of a concealing memory depends on the forgetting of other important impressions. In both cases we are reminded by an intellectual feeling of the intervention of a disturbance, which in each case takes a different form.
In the case of forgetting of names we are aware that the substitutive names are incorrect, in conceal- ing memories we are surprised that we have them at all. This generality purports that the stopping and straying of the reproducing function indicates more often than we suppose that there is an intervention of a tendency which favours one memory and at the same time works against another. The subject of childhood memories appears to me so important and interesting that I would like to de- vote to it a few additional remarks which go beyond the views expressed so far.
How far back into childhood do our memories reach? I am familiar with some investigations on this question by V. Henri  and Potwin. But what connection is there between these variations in the behaviour of childhood reminiscences, and what signification may be ascribed to them?
It seems that it is not enough to procure the material for this [p. I believe we accept too indifferently the fact of infantile amnesia -- that is, the failure of memory for the first years of our lives -- and fail to find in it a strange riddle. We forget of what great intellectual accomplishments and of what complicated emotions a child of four years is capable.
We really ought to wonder why the memory of later years has, as a rule, retained so little of these psychic processes, especially as we have every reason for assume that these same forgotten childhood activities have not glided off without leaving a trace in the development of the person, but that they have left a definite influence for all future time.
Yet in spite of this unparalleled effectiveness were forgotten! This would suggest that there are particularly formed conditions of memory in the sense of conscious reproduc- tion have thus far eluded our knowledge. It is possible that the forgetting of childhood give us the key to the understanding of amnesias which, according to our newer studies, lie at the basis of the forma- tion of all neurotic symptoms. Of these retained childhood reminisces, some appear to us readily comprehensible, while others seem strange or unintelligible.
It is not [p. If the retained reminiscences of a person are subjected to an analytic test, it can be readily ascertained that a guarantee for their correctness does not exist. Some of the memory pictures are surely falsified and incomplete, or displaced in point of time and place.
The assertions of persons examined that their first memories reach back perhaps to their second year are evidently unreliable. Motives can soon be discovered which explain the disfigurement and the displacement of these experiences, but they also demonstrate that these memory lapses are not the result of a mere unreliable memory.
Powerful forces from a later period have moulded the memory capacity of our infantile experiences, and it is probably due to these same forces that the understanding of our childhood is generally so very strange to us.
The recollection of adults, as is known, proceeds through different psychic material. These differences vanish in dreams; all our dreams are preponderatingly visual. But this development is also found in the childhood memo- ries; [p. The visual memory, therefore preserves the type of the infantile recollections.
Only my earliest childhood memories are visual character; they represent plastic depicted scenes, comparable only to stage settings. In these scenes of childhood, whether they prove true or false, one usually sees his childish person both in contour and dress.
This circumstance must excite our wonder, for adults do not see their own per- sons in their reflections of later experiences. Various sources force us to assume the so-called earliest childhood recollections are not true memory traces but later elaborate of the same, elaborations which might have been subjected to the influences of many later psychic forces. However, ow- ing to the previously discussed nature of the relations of the childhood reminiscences to later life, it be- comes extraordinarily difficult to report such examples.
For, in order to attach the value of the conceal- ing memory to an infantile reminiscence, it would be often necessary to present the entire life-history of the person concerned. Only seldom is it possible, as in the following good example, to take out from its context and report a single childhood memory. A twenty-four-year-old man preserved the following picture from the fifth year of his life: In the garden of a summer-house he sat on a stool next to his aunt, who was engaged in teaching him the alpha- bet.
He found difficulty in distinguishing the letter m from n, and he begged his aunt to tell him how to tell one from the other. His aunt called his attention to the fact that the letter m had one whole por- tion a stroke more than the letter n. There was no reason to dispute the reliability of this childhood recollection; its meaning, however, was discovered only later, when it showed itself to be the symbolic representation of another boyish inquisitiveness.
For just as he wanted to know [p. He also discovered that the differ- ence similar one; that the boy again had one portion more than the girl, and at the time of this recog- nition his memory awoke to the responding childish inquisitiveness. I would like to show by one more example the sense that may be gained by a childhood reminiscence through analytic work, although it may seem to contain no sense before. In my forty-third year, when I began to interest myself in what remained in my memory of my own childhood, a scene struck me which for a long time, as I afterwards believed, had repeatedly come to consciousness, and which through reliable identification could be traced to a period before the completion of my third year.
I saw myself in front of a chest, the door of which was held open by my half-brother, twenty years my senior. I stood there demanding something and screaming; my mother, pretty and slender then suddenly en- tered the room, as if returning from the street. In these words I formulated this scene so vividly seen, which, however, furnished no other clue. Wheth- er my brother wished to open or lock the chest in the first explanation it was [p. Such misunderstandings of childhood scenes retained in memory are not uncommon; we recall a situation, but it is not centralized; we do not know on which of the elements to place the psychic accent.
Analytic effort led me to an entirely unexpected solution of the picture. I missed my mother and began to suspect that she was locked in this cupboard or chest, and therefore demanded that my brother should unlock it.
But how did the child get the idea of looking for the absent mother in the chest? Dreams which oc- curred at the same time pointed dimly to a nurse, concerning whom other reminiscences were retained; as, for example, that she conscientiously urged me to deliver to her the small coins which I received as gifts, a detail which in itself may lay claim to the value of a concealing memory for later things.
I then concluded to facilitate for myself this time the [p. I found out all of things, among others the fact that this shrewd but dishonest per- son had committed extensive robberies during the confinement of my mother and that my half-brother was instrumental bringing her to justice.
This information gave me the key to the from childhood, as through a sort of inspiration. When my mother left shortly thereafter I suspected that the naughty brother had treated her in the same way as he did the nurse, and therefore pressed him the chest. I also understand now why in the translation of the visual childhood scene my mothers slenderness was accentuated; she must struck me as being newly restored.
I am and a half years older than the sister born that time, and when I was three years of I was separated from my half-brother. Psychiatrie u. I am in the exceptional position of being about to refer to a previous work on the subject. In the year Meringer and C. Mayer published a study on Mistakes in Speech and Reading, with whose view- points I do not agree. One of the authors, who is the spokesman in the text, is a philologist actuated by a linguistic interest to examine the rules governing those slips.
In this grouping makes no difference whether the transposition disfigurement, fusion, etc. To explain the various forms of mist speech, Meringer assumes a varied psychic value of phonetics. As soon as the innervation the first syllable of a word, or the first word of a sentence, the stimulating process immediately strikes the succeeding sounds, and the following words, and in so far as these innervations are synchronous they may effect some changes in one another.
The stimulus of the psychi- cally [p. It is necessary therefore to determine which are the most important sounds of a word. Meringer states: That which first returns to consciousness invariably had the greatest intensity prior to the forgetting p. Thus the most important sounds are the initial sound of the root-syllable and the initial sound of the word itself, as well as one or another of the accentuated vowels p.
Here I cannot help voicing a contradiction. Whether or not the initial sound of the name belongs to the most important elements of the word, it is surely not true that in the case of the forgetting of the word it first returns to consciousness; the above rule is therefore of no use.
When we observe ourselves during the search for a forgotten name we are comparatively often forced to express the opinion that it begins with a certain letter. This conviction proves to be as often unfounded as founded. Indeed, I would even go so far as to assert that in the majority of cases one reproduces a false initial sound. Also in our ex- ample Signorelli the substitutive name lacked the initial sound, and the principal syl- [p.
How little substitutive names respect the sound of the lost names may be learned from following case. One day I found it impossible to recall the name of the small country whose capital is Monte Carlo. The substitutive names follows: Piedmont, Albania, Montevideo, Colico. In place of Albania Montene- gro soon appeared and then it struck me that the syllable Mont pronounced Mon occurred in all but the last of the substitutive names. It thus became easy for me to find from the name of Prince Albert the forgotten name Monaco.
Colico practically imitates the syllabic sequence and rhythm of the forgotten name. If we admit the conjecture that a mechanism similar to that pointed out in the forgetting names may also play a part in the phenomena speech-blunders, we are then led to a better founded judgment of cases of speech-blunders.
The speech disturbance which manifests a speech-blunder may in the first place be caused by the influence of another component of same speech that is, through a fore-sound or echo, or through another meaning within the sentence or context which differs from that the speaker wishes to utter. In the second place, however, the disturbance could be brought about [p. In both modes of origin of the mistake in speech the common element lies in the simultaneity of the stimulus, while the differentiating elements lie in the arrangement within or with- out the same sentence or context.
The difference does not at first appear as wide as when it is taken into consideration in certain conclu- sions drawn from the symptomatology of speech-mistakes. It is clear, however, that only in the first case is there a prospect of drawing conclusions from the manifestations of speech-blunders concerning a mechanism which connects together sounds and words for the reciprocal influence of their articula- tion; that is, conclusions such as the philologist hopes to gain from the study of speech-blunders.
In the case of disturbance through influence outside of the same sentence or context, it would before all be a question of becoming acquainted with the disturbing elements, and then the question would arise whether the mechanism of this disturbance cannot also suggest the probable laws of the formation of speech.
We cannot maintain that Meringer and Mayer have overlooked the possibility of speech dis- [p. Indeed, they must have observed that the theory of the psy- chic variation of sounds applies, strictly speaking, only to the explanation of disturbances as well as to fore-sounds and sounds.
Where the word disturbances cannot reduced to sound disturbances, as, for example, the substitutions and contaminations of words they, too, have without hesitation sought the cause of the mistake in speech outside of intended context, and proved this state of affairs by means of fitting examples. Now, in my work on the Interpretation of Dreams I have shown the part played by process of conden- sation in the origin of the called manifest contents of the dream from latent thoughts of the dream.
Any similarity of objects or of word-presentations between elements of the unconscious material is taken as a cause for the formation of a third, which is a com- [p.
This element represents both components in the dream content, and in view of this origin it is frequently endowed with numerous contradictory individual determinants. The formation of solutions and con- taminations in speech-mistakes is, therefore, the beginning of that work of condensation which we find taking a most active part in the construction of the dream.
In a small essay destined for the general reader,  Meringer advanced a theory of very practical significance for certain cases of interchanging of words, especially for such cases where one word is substituted by another of opposite meaning. He says: Numerous observations have taught me, however, that we frequently interchange contrasting words; they are already associated in our speech consciousness; they lie very close together and are easily incorrectly evoked.
We have found the analogous mechanism in the analysis of the example aliquis; the inner contradiction asserts itself in the form of forgetting a word instead of a substitution through its opposite.
Having been shown by the last examples of Merinzer and May that speech disturbance may be caused through the influence of fore-sounds, after-sounds, words from the same sentence that were intended for expression, as well as through the effect of words outside the sentence intended, the stimulus of which would otherwise not have been suspected, we shall next wish to discover whether we can defi- nitely separate the two classes of mistakes in speech, and how we can distinguish [p.
But at this stage of the discussion we must also think of the assertions of Wundt, who deals with the manifestations of speech-mistakes in his recent work on the development of language.
The uninhibited stream of sound and word associations stimulated by spoken sounds belongs here in the first place as a positive determinant. This is supported as a negative factor by the relaxation or suppres- sion of the influences of the will which inhibit this stream, and by the active attention which is here a function of volition. Whether that play of association manifests itself in the fact that a coming sound is anticipated or a preceding sound reproduced, or whether a familiar practised sound becomes interca- lated between others, or finally, whether it manifests itself in the fact that altogether different sounds as- sociatively related to the spoken sounds act upon these -- all these questions designate only differences in the direction, and at most in the play of the occurring associations but not in the general nature of the same.
In some cases it may be also doubtful to which form a certain disturbance may be attributed, or whether it would not be more correct to refer [p. Perhaps we could emphasize with even greater firmness than Wundt that the positive factor favouring mistakes in speech the uninhibited stream of associations, and its negative, the relaxation of the inhibiting attention regu- larly attain synchronous action, so that both factors only different determinants of the same process.
With the relaxation, or, more unequivocal pressed, through this relaxation, of the uninhibited attention the uninhibited stream of associations becomes active. The disturbing element is either a single unconscious thought, which comes to light through the special blunder, and can only be brought to consciousness through a searching analysis, or it is a general psy- chic motive, which directs against the entire speech.
I began the quotation once before, and made no mistake the first time. I made the mistake only during the repetition, which was necessary because my daughter, having been distracted from another side, did not listen to me.
This repetition with the added impatience to disbur- den myself of the sentence I must include in the motivation of the speech-blunder, which represented itself as a function of condensation. This speech- blunder may depend on the tendency to facilitate articulation. I must state, however, that this mistake was made by my daughter a few moments after I had said apel, instead of ape.
Mistakes in speech are in a great measure contagious; a similar peculiarity was noticed by Meringer and Mayer in the forget- ting [p. I know of no reason for this contagiousness. In the course of the hour she repeatedly made in mistakes speech, and I finally observed that it only because she imitated me but because she had a special reason in her unconscious to linger on the word earnest Ernst as a name.
It was while analysing her dream, in which her husband is depicted as very generous in money matters -- just the reverse of reality -- that she made this speech-blunder. The day before she had asked for a new set of furs, which her husband denied her, claiming that he could not afford to spend so much money.
The mistake is now comprehensible. Her memory failed to inform her on what part of the body the prying and lustful hand of another had touched her. Soon thereafter she Visited one of her friends, with whom she discussed summer homes.
Asked where her cottage in M.
Naturally you must have thought me a very uneducated person always mistakes the meaning of foreign words I wished to say en passant. The mistake of the previous day had therefore anticipated the recollection, which at that had not yet become conscious.
The associations to Elberton elicited: This recalled travelling in Europe with her cousin, a topic which we had discussed the day before during the analysis of a dream.
The dream dealt with her dislike for this cousin, and she admitted that it was due to the fact that the latter was the favourite of the man whom they met together while travelling abroad.
During the dream analysis she not recall the name of the city in which they met this man, and I did not make any effort time to bring it to her consciousness, as we were then engrossed in a totally different problem.
When [p. Here the mistake served to bring to consciousness in a concealed manner a memory which was connected with a painful feeling. In Matthew Street stands the house in which my wife lived as a bride, The entrance to the house was in another street, and now I noticed that I had forgotten its name and could only recall it through a roundabout method.
The name Matthew, which kept only attention, is thus a substitutive name for the forgotten name of the street. It is more suitable than the name Merchant, for Matthew is exclusively the name of a person, while Merchant is lot. The forgotten street, too, bears the name of a person: Rade- tzky. Without any encouragement she went into details about her marital troubles. She had not lived with her husband for about six months, and she saw him last at the theatre when she saw the play Officer I her attention to the mistake, and she immediately corrected herself, saying that she to say Officer the name of a recent popular play.
He was told that the first consultation was ten dollars; after the examination was over he again as what he was to pay, and added: His last voluntary remarks and his mistake put me on my guard, but after a few more uncalled-for remarks he set me at ease by taking money from his pocket.
He counted four paper dollars and was very [p. I was sure that his mistake betrayed him, that he was only playing with me, but there was nothing to be done. On being asked about this sudden change of heart she said: Speaking of Miss Z. Miss X. To begin with, I may state that in my capacity as a physician I never consider my remuneration: I was visiting a patient who was convalesc- ing from a serious illness.
We had passed through hard days and nights. I was happy to find her im- proved, and I portrayed to her the pleasures of a sojourn in Abbazia, concluding with: My wife engaged a French governess for the afternoons, and later, coming to a satisfactory agreement, wished to retain her testimonials.
Her husband, upon whose request this was done, stood behind the door listening. At the end of my sermonizing, which had made a visible impression, I said: Stekel reports about himself that he had under treatment at the same time two patients from Triest, each of whom he always addressed incorrectly.
However, he easily convinced himself that here the interchange of names bespoke a sort of boast -- that is, he was acquainting each of his Italian patients with the fact that neither was the only resident of Triest who came to Vienna in search of his medical advice.
She was on her way to download some casto- ria for her child. He wanted to know when I would pay him a visit. I reminded him that it was his turn to visit me, and called his attention to the fact that, as was the happy possessor of an au- tomobile would be easier for him to call on me. He gladly promised to call, and asked: His mistake was quite plain. He likes to visit me, but it was incon- venient to travel so far.
November we would both be in the city. My analysis proved correct. I re- marked: My attention having been called to it, I soon discovered that I had another patient of the same name who refused to pay for the treatment.
Smith was also my patient and paid her bills promptly.