One of the most creative philosophers of the 20th century, Rudolf Carnap presented a series of science lectures at the University of California in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science book. Read 7 reviews from the world's largest community for readers. One of the most creative philosophers o. Rudolf Carnap: Philosophy of Science as Engineering Explications Explication, Logical Empiricism 1 Introduction The decision, according to Rudolf Carnap.
|Language:||English, Spanish, Japanese|
|Genre:||Health & Fitness|
|ePub File Size:||24.89 MB|
|PDF File Size:||16.85 MB|
|Distribution:||Free* [*Register to download]|
Rudolf Carnap (–), preeminent member philosophers of science of the twentieth century. In the concluding chapter of his book, Carnap intro-. Philosophical Foundations of Physics. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. ronaldweinland.info October 1 - 3, Carnap was very active in the Vienna Circle. Introduction to the philosophy of science / Merrilee H. Salmon [et al.]. p. Rudolf Carnap, whose theory of probability will be examined in item 6 in Section.
While his work covers a wide spectrum of topics in philosophy of logic and mathematics, philosophy of language, formal philosophy of science, and probability theory among other fields , a particular method of doing philosophy can be identified in all of his contributions. This is the use of formal logic in his approach to philosophical problems. Carnap Thus, he not only applied logical methods in his philosophical work, but also constructed new logical systems and languages along the way. Moreover, there has also been a continuous philosophical reflection on the logical methods used by him. This includes systematic considerations about the nature of logic and its normative status, its proper role in scientific reasoning, as well as its relation to other formal disciplines, most importantly mathematics.
The result is a continuum of confirmation functions expressed by Eq. Conse- quently, as the right-hand side of Eq. Roughly speaking, the conceptual link is that both results assume that sequences of observed samples are exchangeable and the representation theorem tells us how to express the limiting frequency of exchangeable sequences of observations e.
Indeed, Carnap understands his work on inductive logic as an explication project, a philosophical project meant to clarify and help systematize the role of the logical concept of probability in inductive reasoning see French In progress and Kuipers In Carnap , Carnap divides the investigation of the language of science into syntax, semantics and pragmatics see Uebel and he distinguishes be- tween two kinds of linguistic investigations. The first, descriptive, investigation uses the pragmatic facts of a language already in use to articulate explicit semantic and syntactic rules which seem to be implicit in those facts , The second, conventional, investigation does not concern a language already in use.
Nevertheless, such systems still do not make theoretical assertions about the world. For details, see Niiniluoto and the references therein. French is not a branch of empirical science; it does not furnish knowledge concerning facts of nature. It is rather to be regarded as a tool, as one among the logical instruments needed for the task of getting and systematizing knowledge.
As a hammer helps a man do better and more efficiently what he did before with his unaided hand, so a logical tool helps a man do better and more efficiently what he did before with his unaided brain, that is, by means of instinctive habits rather than through deliberate acts guided by explicit rules.
Rather, we may want to make the explicatum more precise or exact so that particular applications of the explicatum are more efficient, more useful, than what we could accomplish before with the explicandum alone. Questions about how to interpret and apply such logics may be informed by the inductive practices and requirements of scientists see , Specifically, the question of how to design an explicatum is a practical question. There are always alternative designs to choose from and each design corresponds to a different way of trying to explicate the explicandum.
But there is no guarantee that any one explica- tum will be more useful in those contexts where the explicandum was ambiguous or vague. Instead, the answer requires a practical decision rather than an assertion: the adequacy of the choice depends, of course, on many theoretical results concerning the properties of the various inductive methods; and therefore the theoretical results may influ- ence the decision.
Nevertheless, the decision itself still remains a practical matter, a matter of X making up his mind, like choosing an instrument for a certain kind of work. In fashioning an inductive logic as we would design and construct an instrument, we make our in- ductive preferences and practices explicit while also keeping in mind how different instruments may more or less satisfy our theoretical aims.
Carnap is well-known for suggesting that philosophical progress can be made in philosophy by transforming traditional philo- sophical questions into precise, technical, questions. The worry, however, is that Carnap is only man- ufacturing technical answers to technical questions, questions orthogonal to legiti- mate philosophical problems. The engineering analogy is used in the recent Carnap reappraisal literature to help explain why Carnap thought his technical projects were still philosophical.
These frameworks are tools, so we do not have to prove that they are correct. Nor do we have to agree on which ones to use. We just have to be clear enough to see what follows from what. Then a new result, whether it is a newly clarified concept or a new theorem is a new and permanent and positive addition to our stock of tools. And Carnap can offer the preceding three decades and more in logic as an example of the sort of continuing progress that he is describing.
Carus , on the other hand, offers a more systematic, but controversial, account of Carnap as conceptual engineer. A more extensive discussion of the engineering analogy — including how to understand engineering itself — can be found in French In progress.
Disagreements, for example, about how to define analyticity for logical systems. We gave some idea of what it means for Carnap to treat a linguistic structure as a tool in the last sec- tion.
More specifically, Carnap has in mind the problem of estimation from theoretical statistics As Carnap points out, one well known solution to this problem — R. Alternatively, in Carnap , Carnap suggests we investigate estimation func- tions without presupposing any inductive method at all.
Indeed, it is not essentially different from the case of applying mathematical geometry to empirically measure physical objects. Letting r1 , Carnap had plans to published more on this concept but did not; although see the manuscripts regarding this concept and the related abstract concept of entropy, RC and RC , at the Rudolf Carnap archives at the Archives of Scientific Philosophy ASP at the University of Pittsburgh.
Instead, the framework provides a concrete example for what philosophers, according to Car- nap, should attempt to achieve: namely, to use technical machinery to help clarify and systematize ambiguous concepts, especially foundational concepts central to both traditional philosophy and science. Of course, Carnap would have expected nothing less: he was, after all, not one to set up prohibitions against the use of technical machinery to help address philosophical problems.
Nevertheless, just because Carnap failed to convince his philosophical and sci- entific peers about the usefulness of his explications that does not mean that the engineering standpoint is flawed. As a way of mediating disagreements and making progress in philosophy, a conceptual engineer crafts concepts with the aim of bring- ing clarity to our intellectual lives by designing and constructing the concepts we use to make theoretical assertions.
As engineering problems, our failures to address philosophical worries become teaching moments: we can learn from our mistakes and try to design concepts more amenable to the sensibilities of our philosophical peers.
Crucially, the upshot of Section 5 is that we can accomplish all this without the requirement that we must first pinpoint and justify our perceived ontological commitments. Indeed, Carnapian conceptual engineering provides an answer to the question whether technical projects should have a place in philosophy at all.
Foundations of Logic and Mathematics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Carnap, R. Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Formalization of Logic. The Continuum of Inductive Methods. Inductive Logic and Science.
Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80 3 : Logical Foundations of Probability, 2nd edition.
In: Richard, J. Carnap Eds. Enlarge cover. Error rating book. Refresh and try again. Open Preview See a Problem? Details if other: Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page.
Martin Gardner Editor. One of the most creative philosophers of the 20th century, Rudolf Carnap presented a series of science lectures at the University of California in The present volume is an outgrowth of that seminar, which dealt with the philosophical foundations of physics.
Edited by Martin Gardner from transcripts of Carnap's classroom lectures and discussions, the book remains one One of the most creative philosophers of the 20th century, Rudolf Carnap presented a series of science lectures at the University of California in Edited by Martin Gardner from transcripts of Carnap's classroom lectures and discussions, the book remains one of the clearest and soundest introductions to the philosophy of science.
Specially designed to appeal to a wide range of readers, An Introduction to thePhilosophy of Science offers accessible coverage of such topics as laws and probability, measurement and quantitative language, the structure of space, causality and determinism, theoretical laws and concepts and much more. Stimulating and thought-provoking, the text will be of interest to philosophers, scientists and anyone interested in logical analysis of the concepts, statements and theories of science.
Get A Copy.
Paperback , pages. Published January 17th by Dover Publications first published January 1st More Details Original Title.
Other Editions 4. Friend Reviews. To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up.
To ask other readers questions about An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science , please sign up. Be the first to ask a question about An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.
Lists with This Book. Community Reviews.
Showing Rating details. Sort order. Nov 19, Aasem Bakhshi rated it it was amazing Shelves: Breadth is great and depth just enough. The only downside is a little less historical development, especially from analytical point of view. Loved it anyway. Sep 22, Amirbabak rated it it was amazing.
I really liked this book because not only it is rather simple but also it is inspiring and kind of answers to many "why"s. May 28, Francesco rated it it was amazing.
It is an excellent books that clarifies a lot of the jargon that is used in science that often times has a different connotation with respect to everyday language. Strongly recommended for people that do not have a background in STEM but not only: May 13, Liam Kofi rated it really liked it Shelves: An introduction to many issues in the philosophy of science which is both engaging and as rigorous as needs be. Make sure to check out the chapter on the Magical View of Language - a thoroughly under-explored philosophical concept which Carnap introduces in this book.
Jun 01, Hangci Du rated it it was amazing Shelves: Fantastic book on philosophy of science! It's a book purely on the theory but not on the history of philosophy, many people write "introduction" books just as a history book, because they are not that professional in that field.