Ecce Homo: How to Become What you Are. Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer. The Case of Wagner: A Musician's Problem. English]. Ecce homo: how to become what you are / Friedrich Nietzsche ; translated . Even for a relatively short book, Ecce Homo was completed very. Nietzsche Notes Ecce Homo 1of 7 Ecce Homo (Ecce Homo) Kaufmann translation () • (Why I am So Wise, 2) For a typically healthy person, conversely.
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Free kindle book and epub digitized and proofread by Project Gutenberg. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Ecce Homo, by Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other . Topics Ecce Homo, Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche, philosophy, autobiography. This volume of Nietzsche's complete works contains his autobiography, Ecce Homo, and selections of Nietzsche's poetry and music. Ecce Homo’s translator: Anthony M. Ludovici. (~ pages).
Even those who suppose, erroneously, that Beyond Good and Evil is a book for browsing, a collection of aphorisms that may be read in any order wbatever, generally recognize that the Genealogy comprises three essays. Moreover, all three essays deal with morality, a subject close to the heart of British and American phi10sopby; and Nietzsche's manner is mucb more sober and single-minded than usual. Moreover, NietDche refers the reader, especially but not only in the preface. It is fashionable to read hutlly, as if, for example, one knew all about Nietzsche's contrast of master and slave morality before one had even begun to read him. But if one reads snip-pets here and there, projecting ill-founded preconceptions into the gaps, one is apt to Illisconstrue Nietzsche's moral philosophy completely-as Loeb and Leopold did when. To understand Nietzsche's conceptions of master and slave morality, one should read Beyond Good and Evil, section , and Human. Niet7J;che distinguishes moralities that originated in ruling classes from moralities that originated among the oppressed.
With that I have given mankind the greatest present that has ever been made to it so far. This book, with a voice bridging centuries, is not only the highest book there is, the book that is truly characterized by the air of the heights—the whole fact of man lies beneath it at a tremendous distance—it is also the deepest, born out of the innermost wealth of truth, an inexhaustible well to which no pail descends without coming up again filled with gold and goodness.
Here no "prophet" is speaking, none of those gruesome hybrids of sickness and will to power whom people call founders of religions. Above all, one must hear aright the tone that comes from this mouth, the halcyon tone, lest one should do wretched injustice to the meaning of its wisdom.
Thoughts that come on doves' feet guide the world. I am a north wind to ripe figs. Thus, like figs, these teachings fall to you, my friends: now consume their juice and their sweet meat. It is fall around us, and pure sky and afternoon. Such things reach only the most select.
It is a privilege without equal to be a listener here. Nobody is free to have ears for Zarathustra. Is not Zarathustra in view of all this a seducer? Precisely the opposite of everything that any "sage," "saint," "world-redeemer," or any other decadent would say in such a case.
You, too, go now, alone. Thus I want it. Go away from me and resist Zarathustra! And even better: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he deceived you.
The man of knowledge must not only love his enemies, he must also be able to hate his friends. One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil. And why do you not want to pluck at my wreath? If it does, this is obscurity of an altogether different kind and easily removed-by a brief footnote, for example.
One is tempted to add that the kind of obscurantism he abominated involves irremediable ambiguities which lead to endless discussion, while his terms, whether German or foreign, are unequivocal. That is true up to a point-but not quite. Nietzsche had an almost pathological weakness for one particular kind of ambiguity, which, to be sure, is not irremediable: he loved words and phrases that mean one thing out of context and almost the opposite in the context he gives them.
He Joved language as poets do and relished these "revaluations. The body of knowledge keeps increasing at incredible speed, The letter fslost.
The quotation is from the final draft, May S.
Books mul.. As long as one knows about existentialism, one can talk about a large number of authors without having actually read their books.
Nietzsche diagnosed this disease in its early stages, long before it had reached its present proportions-yet wrote in a manner that insured his being misunderstood by the kind of reader and nonreader he despised. He gave reasons more than once; for example, in Beyond Good and Evil, sections 30, 40, , , , , and , and in the aforementioned section of The Gay Science.
And I have attempted a different sort of explanation in an essay on "Philosophy versus Poetry. Apart from the fact that something of the flavor of Nietzsche's style and thought would be lost, this is a point at which Nietzsche succeeded in teaching psychOlogy to speak-Nietzschean. His conception of ressentiment constitutes one of his major contributions to psychologyand heJps to illuminate the widespread misunderstanding of Nietzsche. To begin with the first point: At the beginning of his own lengthy essay on "[The role of] Ressentiment in the Construction of Moralities," 4 Max Scheler says: "Among the exceedingly few discoveries made in recent times concerning the origin of mora] value judgments, Friedrich Nietzsche's discovery of ressentiment as the source of such value judgments is the most profound, even if his more specific claim that Christian morality and in particular ChrisChapter 14 of From Shakespeare to Existentialism Boston, Mass.
In the essay on ressentiment he argued: "We believe that Christian values are particularly prone to being reinterpreted into values of ressentfment and have also been understood that way particularly often, but that the core of Christian ethics did not grow on the soil of ressent;ment.
Yet we also believe that the core of bourgeois morality, which since the thirteenth century has begun more and more to supersede Christian morality until it attained its supreme achievement in the French Revolution, does have its roots in ressentiment! In any case, this essay does not compare in originality and importance with Nietzsche's Genealogy, but it deserves mention as an attempt to develop Nietzsche's ideas, and it shows how the term ressent;ment has become established.
Nietzsche's conception of ressentiment also throws light on I Ibid. Both here and on p. T Ibid. By way of contrast, consider Max Weber, perhaps the greatest sociologist of the century, and certainly one of the greatest. Weber's sociology of religion owes a great deal to Nietzsche's Genealogy. But why is itgeneraUy recognized that Weber was by no means an anti-Semite, although he found the clue to the Jewish religiqn in the alleged fact that the Jews were a pariah people, while Nietzsche's comments on slave morality and the slave rebellion in morals have so often been considered highly offensive and tinged by anti-Semitism?
Nietzsche's many references to anti-Semitism are invariably scathing: see the indices in this volume. Could it be that a scholar is given the bene.. To write about Nietzsche uscholars" 'with the lack of inhibition with which they have written about Nietzsche, mixing moralistic denunciations with attempts at psychiatric explanations, would be utterly unthinkable.
The answer is clearly not that Nietzsche really was an inferior scholar and did eventually become insane. Most Nietzsche "scholars" cannot hold a candle to his learning or originality, and the closer they are to meriting psychological explanations, the worse it would be to offer any. Could the reason for the disparity in treatment be that Nietzsche is dead?
We are in no danger of hurting his feelings or his career; and he cannot hit back. He is no longer a member of the family; he has left us and is fair game. But Max Weber is dead, too; yet he is still treated as a member of the guild. Clearly, there must be another reason. Nietzsche wrote too well and was too superior. That removed him from the immunity of our community, quite as much as the commission of a crime. But where the transgression has been spiritual or intel1ectual, and those offended are the intellectual community, the revenge, too, is intellectual.
The pent-up resentment against fellow members of the community-sloppy scholars and writers as well as those who excite envy-all this rancor that cannot be vented against living colleagues, at least not in print, may be poured out against a few great scapegoats.
But there are even more such studies in German-which is scarcely surprising. After all, Nietzsche said far more wicked things-incomparably more and worse-about the Germans than he. And as the literature shows us beyond a doubt: Christian scholars also needed outlets for their rancor.
For all that, it'would be wrong to think in terms of any strict tit-for-tat, as if each group the dead man had offended then felt justified in hitting back once he was dead. Apart from these considerations, Nietzsche's reception cannot be understood. To be sure, reactions of that sort do not exhaust this story. But to understand that, one only has to read them-and him.
All three inquiries deal with the origins of moral phenomena, as the title of the book indicates. The first essay, which contrasts uGood and Evil" with "Good and Bad," juxtaposes master and slave morality; the second essay considers "guilt," the "bad conscience," and related matters; and the third, ascetic ideals.
The most com.. Any such view is wrong in detail and can be refuted both by considering in context the truncated quotations that have been adduced to buttress it and by citing a large number of other passages. I have tried to do this in my book on Nietzsche,9 and this is not the place to repeat the demonstration.
But this sort of misinterpretation involves not only hundreds of particular misreadings, it also involves a misreading of the Genealogy and, even more generally, of Nietzsche's attitude toward history and the world.
In conclusion, something needs to be said about that. The Genealogy is intended as a supplement and clarification of Beyond Good and Evil. And while that title suggests an attempt to rise above the slave morality that contrasts good and evil, it also signifies a very broad attack on lithe faith in opposite values. The reason in this is that when defensive expenditures, be they ever so small, become the rule and a habit, they entail an extraordinary and entirely superfluous impoverishment.
Our great expenses are composed of the most frequent small ones. Warding off, not letting things come close, involves an expenditure—let nobody deceive himself about this—energy wasted on negative ends.
Merely through the constant need to ward off, one can become weak enough to be unable to defend oneself any longer. Suppose I stepped out of my house and found, instead of quiet, aristocratic Turin, a small German town: Or I found a German big city—this built-up vice where nothing grows, where everything, good or bad, is imported. But having quills is a waste, even a double luxury when one can choose not to have quills but open hands.
As a parable I choose association with books. Scholars who at bottom do little nowadays but thumb books—philologists, at a moderate estimate, about a day—ultimately lose entirely their capacity to think for themselves. They respond to a stimulus a thought they have read whenever they think—in the end, they do nothing but react.
Scholars spend all of their energies on saying Yes and No, on criticism of what others have thought—they themselves no longer think. The instinct of self-defense has become worn-out in them; otherwise they would resist books. The scholar—a decadent.
I have seen this with my own eyes: I only harm myself, the more so if I am destined to represent great tasks. Precisely here one must begin to relearn. When I now compare myself with the men who have so far been honored as the first, the difference is palpable. I want to be their opposite: There is no pathological trait in me; even in periods of severe sickness I never became pathological; in vain would one seek for a trait of fanaticism in my character. There is not a moment in my life to which one could point to convict me of a presumptuous and pathetic posture.
The pathos of poses does not belong to greatness; whoever needs poses at all is false. Whoever saw me during the seventy days this fall when, without interruption, I did several things of the first rank the like of which nobody will do after me—or impose on me—with a responsibility for all millennia after me, will not have noticed any trace of tension in me; but rather an overflowing freshness and cheerfulness. I never ate with more pleasant feelings; I never slept better.
I do not know any other way of associating with great tasks than play: The least compulsion, a gloomy mien, or any harsh tone in the throat are all objections to a man; how much more against his work! To this day I still have the same affability for everyone; I even treat with special respect those who are lowliest: If I despise a man, he guesses that I despise him: My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it—all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary—but love it.
For what one lacks access to from experience one will have no ear. Now let us imagine an extreme case: In that case, simply nothing will be heard, but there will be the acoustic illusion that where nothing is heard, nothing is there.
This is, in the end, my average experience and, if you will, the originality of my experience. Secondly, there is the understanding of Socratism: Socrates is recognized for the first time as an instrument of Greek disintegration, as a typical decadent. Profound, hostile silence about Christianity throughout the book. That is neither Apollinian nor Dionysian; it negates all aesthetic values—the only values recognized in The Birth of Tragedy: Nothing in existence may be subtracted, nothing is dispensable—those aspects of existence which Christians and other nihilists repudiate are actually on an infinitely higher level in the order of rank among values than that which the instinct of decadence could approve and call good.
To comprehend this requires courage and, as a condition of that, an excess of strength: They are not free to know: I retained some doubt in the case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and better than anywhere else.
The affirmation of passing away and destroying, which is the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy; saying Yes to opposition and war; becoming, along with a radical repudiation of the very concept of being—all this is clearly more closely related to me than anything else thought to date.
At least the Stoa has traces of it, and the Stoics inherited almost all of their principal notions from Heraclitus. It shows my prudence that I was many things and in many places in order to be able to become one thing—to be able to attain one thing. I had to be a scholar, too, for some time.
I noted a total aberration of my instincts of which particular blunders, whether Wagner or the professorship at Basel, were mere symptoms.
I was overcome by impatience with myself; I saw that it was high time for me to recall and reflect on myself.