HIZB NASR PDF

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Selected Supplications (Hizb al-Nasr of Haddad and Hizb al-Nasr of Shadhili). by Smirna Si. Topics islam. Collectionopensource. Language. (pdf) Hizb al-Bahr by Sayyidi al-Imam Abul Hasan al-Shadhili a more >> Al- Yaqutiyya (pdf) Hizb al-Nasr Hizb al-Bahr - The Litany of the Sea by Sayyidi Abul. Hizb al-Nasr - حزب النصر - The Lintany of Victory. By al-Mudir June 10, June 15, Shahdili . Damas Cultural Society. Print Friendly, PDF & Email.


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The Hizb al-Naṣr, or. Litany of Victory, was composed approximately years ago by the great Shaykh Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī (//). Hizb Al--Nasr - Free download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read online for free. This is the famous Hizb Al-Nasr of Imam Shazuli (ra). It is available at. ronaldweinland.info - Download as PDF File .pdf) or read online.

It will dazzle the eyes of the envious, the rebellious and the devils, among all of mankind and the jinn, so they cannot strike me with the arrows of their envy Bismi'llahi 'r-Rahmani 'r-Rahim. O Allah, I beg You to grant me immersion in the ocean of the light Allahumma as'alu-ka ghamsatan fi bahri nuri of Your compelling Dignity, outwardly and inwardly potent and powerful, Haibati-ka 'l-qahirati 'D-Dahirati 'l-batinati 'l-qadirati 'l-muqtadira: until my face is aglow with rays from the light of Your Dignity. It will dazzle the eyes of the envious, the rebellious and the devils, takhtafu 'uyuna 'l-hasadati wa 'l-maradati wa 'sh-shayatin: among all of mankind and the jinn, mina 'l-insi wa 'l-jinni ajma'in: so they cannot strike me with the arrows of their envy, fa-la yarshuqu-ni bi-sihami hasadi-him and with their inner and outer intrigues, wa maka'idi-hum 'l-batinati wa 'D-Dahirati and so their eyes are ashamed to look at me, wa tasiru absaru-hum khashi'atan li-ru'yati and their necks are bowed before my onslaught. Shield me, O Allah, with the shield of which wa 'hjub-ni Allahumma bi'l-hijabi 'lladhi the inner side is radiant light, so that my spiritual states batinu-hu 'n-nuru are beautified by its intimate friendship, fa-tabtahiju ahwali bi-unsi-hi and my words and my deeds are fortified by its touch, wa tata'ayyadu aqwali wa af'ali bi-hissi-hi and of which the outer side is fire, wa Dahiru-hu 'n-naru so that it scorches the faces of my foes fa-talfahu wujuha a'da'i with a scorching that cuts their desires off from me, lafhatan taqta'u mawadda-hum 'an-ni until they turn away from their objectives, as outcasts, hatta tusaddu 'an mawaridi-him khasi'ina losers and failures, disgraced and abased and humiliated.

My heart is now fully convinced that there is no god but You. You are indeed Capable of all things. Not one of the heavens is concealed from Him. Allahumma ya Man la tara-hu 'l-'uyun. O All-Forbearing One! You are Aware of my condition. Allahumma 'j'al khaira 'amali khawatima-hu. You are indeed the Worthy Sovereign! O Radiant Source of the Proof! O He of Whom no place is empty.

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Omniscience Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. This further facilitated and encouraged the formation of a regional organization. The operation that resulted in the collapse of government in the town was coordinated jointly by different mujahedin forces in the region.

Sazman-e Nasr Victory Organization played a central and coordinating role in the attack. This development marked the elimination of any presence of the Kabul government within the entire Hazarajat region [9].

Henceforth Bamyan was the centre of important political developments. It injected a new stimulus into the ongoing unification process among the mujahedin organizations in the region.

The town hosted the final meeting that resulted in the declaration of the Misaq-e Wahdat, or the unity treaty in July less than a year after its liberation.

It became a centre of political leadership and power for the new party beyond and away from the local factional and personal rivalries of local commanders. What contrasted the negotiation process for the formation of Wahdat with similar previous efforts was that it was essentially a process initiated from within the Hazarajat region. The process was informed and shaped by the realities of war, factionalism and loss of control of the political leaderships over military commanders within the region.

Conversely, the previous coalition-building efforts were centered in Iran and were often under the direct influence of the Iranian authorities.

Once it was formed, its leaders faced the challenge of convincing their representatives at the Shuray-e Eatelaf and officials of the Iranian government, who were more at ease with dealing with a coalition of separate parties in Tehran.

The fragmentation of the Hazara mujahedin had given the Iranians effective leverage to control small organizations, often tied to various religious authorities and government agencies in Iran.

The Iranians feared that a single party based inside Afghanistan could mean they would lose control over the movement. Furthermore, the increasingly evident ethnic discourse within the party was seen unfavorably by the Iranian authorities who had for years tried to promote a more pan- Shiite political Islamism during the period of jihad. Husain Ibrahimi, the representative of the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei in Afghan affairs at that time, is alleged to have tried to prevent the formation of Hizb-e Wahdat in order to maintain his influence.

Eventually, once the party was formed, the Iranians decided to work with it and supported it in the early days of its existence. But, as the subsequent course of political developments discussed below shows, the party was to pursue a rather independent political strategy, often in conflict with Iranian policies and interests in the country. As the name Wahdat Unity indicates, the main objective of the party was to unify all Shiite mujahedin organizations under a single political leadership.

It was created in response to a strong urge for unity among the Hazara leaders as well as commoners. The search for change and unity was instigated and led in particular by the senior leaders of the two main organizations, Pasdaran and Nasr, which were the most exposed to the threat of deligitimisation as a result of their loss of control over their military commanders.

This turned out to be a major contentious issue throughout several rounds of negotiations in the run up to formation of the party. Smaller parties pressed for equal representation of all groups while the more powerful ones demanded greater power and a share of the positions in the unified party.

Eventually the latter argument prevailed; Nasr and Pasdaran persuaded other organizations to concede to proportional representation. Smaller parties were pressured and even intimidated into joining the process.

Hizb Al--Nasr

Many groups had no other choice than joining it: The following two examples provide insight into the complexity of the process. The party was dominated by non-Hazara Shiites. Initially, the party was represented in a series of negotiations, but Mohsini later declined to sign, having presented a number of conditions to be met. His conditions were interpreted as an unwillingness to join a party in which historical Hazara grievances and political aspirations predominated.

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Nonetheless, sections of his party joined Hezb-e Wahdat either because the new party was more promising for the political future of the Hazaras or because the pressure to join was so strong that it could not be resisted. The party's core could resist the pressure to join mainly because it was located outside the region. However, it did lose a substantial section of its Hazara following to Hezb-e Wahdat, a fact underlining the growing importance of ethnic identities in the aftermath of jihad in the country.

The military class that had flourished during the civil war posed one of the main obstacles to unification. Nahzat-e Islami is a good example of military commanders refusing to unite in spite of the agreement of their leaders.

Its senior leaders participated in the unification process and hosted one of the meetings in their stronghold in the Jaghori district of Ghazni province. However, Wasiq, Nehzat's main military commander in the district, refused to dismantle his military structure and continued to operate under the name of Nahzat. This resulted in a military confrontation with the formerly Nasr commanders who were fighting on behalf of Hezb-e Wahdat. The conflict resulted in the total defeat of Nahzat and other smaller organisations in this district in As a result, Wahdat in Jaghori and most other parts of Ghazni established itself through the military victory of the former Nasr forces.

One after the other the smaller parties were pressured or coaxed to join the process. In November , the remnant of Behisthi's Shuray-e Ittefaq also joined. His decision to participate in the unification process was a turning point in the development of clerical leadership in the Hazarajat, as it symbolized the recognition of Khomeinist hegemony by important non-Khomeinist elements of the clergy. Behishthi's Shura was different from other organizations.

He represented the conservative and non-revolutionary component of the ulema. By the time Hezb-e Wahdat was in the making, Beheshti was reduced to leading a small fraction of the Shura in Nawur district of Ghazni. The ambition to integrate previously hostile organizations into a single party had achieved a great degree of success. Officially, all the previous organizations except Harakat were dissolved and their military structures were dismantled.

A relatively stable political order was restored in the areas under its control. However, the party suffered from serious structural problems and ideological differences. Ideologically, most Hezb-e Wahdat leaders were political Islamists.

Nasr pdf hizb

In a way the formation of the party was the culmination of a process of Islamisation of the Hazara anti-Soviet resistance groups in Afghanistan. The process was accompanied by the gradual rise to dominance of the clergy in the political leadership of the region, and in fact it marked the final victory of the clerical Islamists.

Hezbe Wahdat

By unifying under the new name they further consolidated their political dominance. The Wahdat manifesto emphasized the continuation and intensification of efforts for the creation of an Islamic government based on the Quran and Sunnah.

It called for further efforts to incorporate all other genuine Shiite groups into the party and to act in solidarity with all Islamic organizations of the Sunnis. The language of the manifesto clearly indicates that Wahdat was to be, at least predominately, a Shiite organization, despite references to solidarity and cooperation with the Sunni organizations. It demanded an equal status for Shiite jurisprudence alongside the Hanafi school, dominant among Sunnis in the country.

As a religious party, Hezb-e Wahdat can be credited with an openness and inclusiveness exceptional in a conservative society like Afghanistan. In an exceptional move among the Afghan mujahedin, the party included ten women members in its central council and had devoted an entire committee for women's affairs that was headed by a university-educated Hazara woman. The main point, however, is that the movement gradually tilted towards its ethnic support base.

Subsequent political developments in Kabul exposed the difficulties of establishing an Islamic government in the country. With the fall of the communist regime in Kabul and the failure to form an Islamic government, the warring factions turned to their ethnic and regional support bases. While Islamism remained the officially proclaimed ideology of most groups, ethnic demands and power struggles surfaced as major sources of political mobilization.

Wahdat's leaders were endeavoring to strike a balance between ethnicity and religion. The result was an Islamic ideology used to express and further the rights of a historically disadvantaged community; a strong desire for unity of the Hazaras was its main driving force. In fact, ideologically, Nasr's trademark combination of ethnic nationalism and radical Islamism increasingly became the ideology of Wahdat, an ethnic discourse dominated by, and expressed through, an Islamic language.

Abdul Ali Mazari , a former member of Nasr and first secretary general of Wahdat, was the main agent of the explicit transformation of the party into a platform for the rights and political demands of the Hazaras. When he arrived in Kabul in , he further opened the door of the party to Hazaras of all social and ideological backgrounds. A group of former leftists and government bureaucrats joined the inner circle of the party leadership, generating further rifts. This was a real test of political tolerance of the more conservative section of the clergy.

While the party was created to unify the predominantly Islamist and clerical organizations, in Kabul it confronted groups of educated Hazaras much larger than had been the case in the provinces; these were also mostly leftist and relatively well organized. The question of whether the party should accept these individuals divided the party leadership.

The ulema Scholars needed the knowledge and experiences of these educated Hazaras to help the party adjust to an urban political setting. The party suffered from a chronic shortage of members who had benefited from a modern education.

Furthermore, most of the clerics had little familiarity with the politics of Kabul. Most of them were educated in religious centers in Iran and Iraq and had mainly engaged in politics in rural Hazarajat. Finally, Wahdat fighters lacked military skills suitable to an urban environment.

Despite that, many key figures in the central council opposed the inclusion of the educated Kabulis in the party, viewing them as godless communists. While none of the former leftists were given any position of authority within the party leadership, their strengthening relationship with, and perceived influence on, Abdul Ali Mazari angered the more conservative sections of the party.

On the other hand, the leftists did not seek any official positions within the party ranks. They were mostly concerned with ensuring their personal security and avoiding persecution by the mujahedin.

hizb-l-nasr.pdf

The idea of building an Islamic government and promoting religious fraternity rapidly ran into difficulties. Hezb-e Wahdat's stance as the representative of the Hazara mujahedin was not welcomed by its Sunni counterparts in Peshawar. Instead, it was effectively excluded from the negotiations around the formation of a mujahedin government in Kabul, which were dominated by the Sunnis. A Hezb-e Wahdat delegation to Peshawar, sent to negotiate a possible inclusion in the process, returned to Bamyan badly disappointed.

In a central council meeting in Bamyan, the delegation headed by Abdul Ali Mazari raised the issue of deliberating a new political strategy.

Some of the Sunni fundamentalist parties had basically ignored the Shiite claims of any form of effective representation in a future government. In opposition to Hezb-e Wahdat's demand of a quarter share in future power-sharing arrangements, some of the Sunni parties stated that the Shiites did not count as a significant community, deserving to be included in the negotiation process.

Three days of deliberations in the party's central council in Bamyan produced a new strategy: This new strategy was to be pursued with the military commanders of various communities in the provinces rather than with the leaders in Peshawar.

Government officials of various ethnic communities were also contacted to join or support the new alliance. The new strategy was communicated with various political and military players in the country through delegations and representatives. Fifty delegations were dispatched to several parts of the country, including the Panjshir valley and the northern province of Balkh. Members of the delegations were tasked with exploring a common political strategy for collectively bargaining over the rights of minorities in future political arrangements.

Massoud was chosen as head of the new council, Mohammad Mohaqiq from Hezb-e Wahdat as his deputy and General Dostum as commander of its military affairs. Similarly, the political arrangements among the Sunni mujahedin organisations also fell apart, turning the city into a battleground for the most devastating and atrocious conflicts.

Wahdat became an important part of the conflict for nearly three years. This provoked intense internal debates within the party. The questions of external alignments further inflamed the internal tensions. Muhammad Akbari rose as leader of a pro-Massoud camp within the party, challenging the wisdom of Abdul Ali Mazari's refusal to join Burhanuddin Rabbani's and Massoud's government and his participation in an alliance with Hekmatyar , the leader of Hezb-e Islami , who had emerged as the main opposition.

The differences between Abdul Ali Mazari and Akbari resulted in the first major split within the party. After the split, both leaders maintained separate political and military organisations under the name of Wahdat, with Abdul Ali Mazari maintaining the main body of the party.

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The growing rivalries and tensions between the two leaders surfaced strongly in the preparations for the party's leadership election in September The election was held amid a heightened competition between the two contending figures for leadership of the party.

The party was experiencing its most difficult internal power struggle since it had been formed. New political fault lines were emerging as the party leaders tried to define and articulate their political agendas in Kabul. Both sides were determined to win in order to dominate leadership positions and consequently change the political direction of the party.

The venue for the forthcoming elections also proved to be contentious. Akbari was pressing for the elections to be held in Bamyan where he felt stronger. By contrast, Mazari and his supporters pushed for elections in Kabul where he had cultivated a larger support base among urbanised Hazaras.

Given the political differences and personal rivalries between the two leaders, the first election of the secretary general of the party was hotly contested. It was also particularly sensitive given the context of the civil war in Kabul, with regards to which both figures were proposing different political directions for the party. Akbari hoped he could alter the role of the party in the war and in the conflict in Kabul in favour of Rabbani's government through his election as secretary general of the party.

Consequently, the election of secretary general gained a paramount importance for both sides in the civil war to maintain or change the political alignments of the party in their favour. The elections were held amid a climate of distrust and violence.

By gaining 43 votes out of 82 members of the central council present , Abdul Ali Mazari was re-elected as leader. Akbari with 33 votes was elected as his first deputy.

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Similarly, agreements were reached on 20 other key appointments. Akbari's faction won the positions of heads of cultural and military committees, which they had strongly pressed for. He and his supporters believed that by dominating the cultural and military committees they could manipulate the war and propaganda machine of the party in favour of the Rabbani government, their external ally. Karim Khalili, who would later become the leader of the party, was elected as chief of its political affairs committee.

The voting patterns during the elections offer important insights into the internal politics of the party. Members of Nasr and Pasdaran, the two largest and most powerful numerically and politically, dominated the process as well as the two emergent factions.

While Nasr maintained its cohesiveness, most other smaller organisations were divided. All former members of Nasr in the council voted for Mazari, testifying to the lasting cohesiveness of Nasr as a political block within Wahdat. By contrast, while most former members of Pasdaran supported Akbari, some of them cast their votes for Mazari.

Pdf hizb nasr